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SARA K N O X
This essay considers a range of discourses on identity and the definition of culture. I have
little doubt that, generally speaking, Indigenous people are quite capable of defining the
meaning of ‘Indigenous person’ or ‘culture’ in a way that satisfies their specific immediate
needs and interests. My concern here is with the definition of ‘Aboriginal or Indigenous
person’ in Australian law and legislation and with the critical response, by members of the
scientific community as well as cultural theorists, to re f e rences to a biological basis 
of identity.
T h e re is a considerable diff e rence, I shall argue, between biology or genetics and what we
understand to be identity, but this does not mean that identity can be reduced to an inter-
personal or cultural construct. Since it isn’t simply the case that culture has a biological,
physical or material basis, but that any such re p resentation is also cultural, a sense of a
c u l t u r a l - re p resentational politics and its relationship to the question of self-determ i n a t i o n
a re critical to these types of definitional questions. This would not only include the con-
ceptualisation and definition of identity, but also the way culture, physiology or material-
ity is understood to relate. To adapt the insights of Michel Foucault, we might say that it is
i m p o rtant, for political and ethical reasons, to highlight the relationship between knowl-
edge, as a re p resentational system, as traditions and discourses of what is held to be ‘known’,
and power, as a type of enabling, capacity or determination of what can be or what is con-
s i d e red legitimate or re c o g n i s e d .1
The definition of who and what an Indigenous or Aboriginal Australian is determines who
is eligible to claim Indigenous rights and entitlements under Commonwealth and state law
and legislation. But, in addition, by establishing a relationship between a certain subject and
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their attributes or pro p e rties, such definitions also determine what kind of things can fall
under the scope of or can ‘belong’ to these term s .2
The relationship between a subject and what is considered to ‘belong’ to or characterise
it is not simply determined through a descriptive process, since what is described is pre-
sumed to be an instantiation of what is to be defined. Meaning or definition is established
by drawing on terms within an already established discourse or re g i s t e r. It may not be sur-
prising to find, there f o re, that definitions in legislation and law have tended to be rather cir-
c u l a r, taking a form like ‘Aboriginal person means a person who is an Indigenous person
of Australia’ (for specific examples, see below).
Legal historian John McCorquodale has noted that since the time of ‘settlement’ in Aus-
tralia, Commonwealth and state governments have used at least sixty-seven classifications,
descriptions or definitions of an Aboriginal person.3 A range of cases has highlighted
p roblems with the current definitions in use. For example, in The State of Tasmania v. The
Commonwealth (1983), the High Court considered the definition of an ‘Aborigine’ for the
purposes of s51(xxvi) of the constitution, in relation to the phrase ‘laws with respect to the
people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws’. Deane J devel-
oped a thre e - p a rt ‘test’ to determine the right to identify as an Indigenous person:
By ‘Australian Aboriginal’ I mean, in accordance with what I understand to be the conven-
tional meaning of the term, a person of Aboriginal descent, albeit mixed, who identifies him-
self as such and who is recognized by the Aboriginal community as an Aboriginal.4
In Mabo v. The State of Queensland (1992) Brennan J adopted virtually the same test in
relation to Native title:
Membership of the Indigenous people depends on biological descent from Indigenous people
and on mutual recognition of a particular person’s membership by that person and by the
elders or other persons enjoying traditional authority among those people.5
This definition was adopted in the Native Title Act 1993 and other federal legislation that
allows for Indigenous rights and benefits.
In A t t o rney-General (Cwlth) v. Queensland (1990), the Federal Court considered this defi-
nitional matter in relation to letters patent, authorising the royal commission to inquire into
the deaths in custody of ‘Aboriginal and To rres Strait Islanders’. The Queensland govern-
ment had argued that the royal commission could not inquire into the death of a seventeen-
y e a r-old boy in custody because he did not identify as Aboriginal and was not recognised by
the Aboriginal community. The Federal Court, however, decided that Aboriginal descent was
s u fficient proof of Aboriginality.
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In Gibbs v. Capewell (1995), the Federal Court considered the meaning of the statutory
definition of an Aboriginal person in the Aboriginal and To rres Strait Islander Commission
Act 1989 (Cwlth). The ATSIC Act defines an Aboriginal person as ‘a member of an Aboriginal
race of Australia’. Drummond J held that parliament’s intention was ‘to refer to the gro u p
of persons in the modern Australian population who are descended from the inhabitants
of Australia immediately prior to European settlement’.6
R e c e n t l y, Mick Dodson, the Aboriginal and To rres Strait Islander Social Justice Com-
m i s s i o n e r, noted that judges have tended to define descent by re f e rence to ‘pseudo-scientific
concepts such as “genetic inheritance”, “quantum of Aboriginal genes” and “one sixty-fourt h
or one thirty-second Aboriginal genes”. They have held that “Aboriginal genes” are a neces-
s a ry, but not sufficient, element of Aboriginality. ’7
In Shaw v. Wolfe (1998), the Federal Court again considered the meaning of ‘Aboriginal
person’ for the purposes of the ATSIC Act 1989, in part i c u l a r, insofar as that Act pro v i d e s
that a person is entitled to vote in a regional council ward election as an Aboriginal or To rre s
Strait Islander person.8 In a finding that echoed that of Drummond J, Merkel J held that
descent was the cornerstone of Aboriginality. In this particular case some of those alleged
not to be Aboriginal identified as Aboriginal, were acknowledged by the relevant Abori-
ginal communities as Aboriginal, but had difficulty verifying this by way of documentary
or ‘archival’ evidence. This is hardly surprising due to the inadequacies of colonial arc h i v e -
keeping, and past policies of removal, discrimination, dispossession and persecution that
would have undoubtedly given reason for individuals and groups to ‘conceal’ their iden-
tity or ‘assume’ another. Tasmania was the site of a concerted eff o rt to completely eradicate
all Indigenous inhabitants, an eff o rt that led to a widely held belief that Ta s m a n i a ’s Indige-
nous population ceased to exist. For some the dispute brought back traumatic memories
of the past. Some went as far as to seek genetic tests to verify their Aboriginality, while others
felt that, in attempting to prove their identity to the satisfaction of the court, they had 
much to lose and little to gain and that the process was too upsetting. Conflicting 
or ambiguous historical re c o rds, for example, may leave the answer to the question of 
descent unclear.
These approaches, I argue, set up a problematic separation of the ‘cultural’ and the ‘bio-
logical’ conditions of identification that reflects a particular understanding of identification.
P resenting the test as objective masks the assumption and consolidation of non-Indigenous
authority with respect to the definition of culture and identity. This form of naturalisation
derives its authority from its assumption of objectivity, so that the genetic construction of
cultural or racial identity is taken to be a description of certain ‘real’ characteristics and
not a conceptualisation or re p re s e n t a t i o n .
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Thus, apparently descriptive acts are in fact both normative and perf o rmative. As Mick
Dodson has argued, while these definitions are presented as if they are objective fact, they
a re ‘infinitely elastic’:
the definitions have served to meet the various and changing interests and aspirations of
those who constructed them, the colonizing or ‘modern’ state. Where there was a need to
c reate a boundary between ‘primitive’ and ‘modern man’, to legitimise ‘pro g ress’, to justify
p a rticular economic and political developments, to promote a national identity for a colo-
nial nation, or more specifically to control, manage or assimilate Indigenous cultures, Abori-
ginality has been made to fit the bill.9
When looking for an answer to the meaning of the term ‘Aboriginal person’, judges often
refer to ‘conventional usage’ (to recall the words of Deane J in Commonwealth v. Ta s m a n i a) .
‘Convention’ led the judges to the thre e - p a rt test and the emphasis on descent as genetic
or biological descent. Of course, convention is not universal or consensual. There are Indi-
genous conventions that differ greatly from those accepted by the judges.1 0 Indeed, in scien-
tific circles, as we will see, it is likely to be u n c o n v e n t i o n a l to associate cultural, ethnic or racial
identity with genetics.
R ace and genetics
Let us stop for a moment and consider the description of descent re f e rred to by Mick Dodson
above, that of ‘one sixty-fourth or one thirty-second Aboriginal genes’. Putting aside our
understanding of descent in terms of ancestry, how could a person have genes diff e re n t i a t e d
or fractionalised in this manner? Geneticists have recently intervened in the debate con-
c e rning the genetic or biological basis for racial or ethnic categories. Science Magazine’s Eliot
Marshall, following the argument of Yale University geneticist Kenneth Kidd, states ‘there ’s
no such thing as race in [modern] Homo sapiens’ and recommends, along with the American
A n t h ropological Association, that governments ‘do away with racial categories and, in politi-
cal matters, let people define their own ethnicity’.1 1 Somewhat in keeping with this, the Aus-
tralian Law Reform Commission and Australian Health Ethics Committee have suggested
that the meaning of Aboriginality should rely upon ‘a social construct of identity’.1 2
These observations are important; nevertheless, significant problems arise from the idea
that Indigenous cultural identity can be reduced to political or personal or social matter.
While the suggestion that diff e rences would be better understood as cultural is drawn
f rom the simple scientific fact that DNA and genetics provide no basis for this type of dif-
f e rentiation and is motivated by anti-racist sentiment, it could have the effect of under-
mining ‘special’ rights provided to groups based on certain forms of identity or cultural
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membership. Indeed, part of the difficulty with this approach stems from the way it assumes
a common ground in terms of which identification is understood. This position tends to
posit humanity as a general category, which assumes varying forms according to diff e r i n g
social, historical, physical, material and environmental conditions. Culture, society and belief
systems are built on top of basic physical, biological facts. Indigenous cultures are thus under-
stood as t y p e s of culture, Indigenous identities as types of identity. My point is not to dispute
this project, but rather to argue that it is not politically or culturally neutral either.
C o n s i d e r, for example, the claim that Indigenous cultural identity can be understood as
a self-perception, as a social identification and set of experiences associated with that iden-
tification. Identity is thus reduced to social and psychological conditions, which, for
example, urban, dispossessed Indigenous persons may find themselves unable to satisfy. This
highlights how moving or shifting the basis of identification from physical or biological con-
ditions to social and environmental conditions is not less naturalising, normalising or objec-
tifying. Instead such a shift may perpetuate new ‘conditions of identification’ as if they are
objective events in the ‘real world’ rather than a form or system of re p resentation. It may
even be that such an approach seems to make identification more contingent and there f o re
f r a g i l e .
As Paul Rabinow has noted of the biologicalisation of identity that he associates with
the modern geneticist’s approach to humanity:
the identification of DNA with ‘the human person’[is] … a self evident synecdochial
relationship—the part literally stands for the whole … To equate ‘the human person’ with
body parts or with DNA is to provide a solution to a problem that has not yet been ade-
quately posed.1 3
The ideology of colonialism has been historically tied to the promotion of a certain notion
of ‘the human’. Indeed, as critics such as Franz Fanon have argued, the notion of the human
has been used to justify and legitimise all sorts of dehumanising activities: the persecution
of those deemed less human; the implementation of policies aimed at humanising those less
‘civilised’ or ‘advanced’; as well as murd e r, displacement and destruction. From the per-
spective of the colonised the rhetoric of humanism, humanity and mankind is not so con-
vincing. As Fanon has argued, the colonisers ‘[l]eave this Europe where they are never done
talking of Man, yet murder men every w h e re they find them … today we know with what
s u fferings humanity has paid for every one of their triumphs of the mind’.1 4
These criticisms highlight the link between the devastating legacy of colonialism and
the ideology of humanism and humanity, where the universalisation of a particular under-
standing of humanity was not only used to justify the imposition of European ideals and
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m o res, but also frequently defined aspects of non-European society and culture as inhuman.
As Fanon has observed, the ontology of ‘Man’, once recognised as a notion that emerges fro m
a specific political, cultural and geographic understanding,
does not permit us to understand the being of the black man … His metaphysics, or, less
p re t e n t i o u s l y, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out 
because they were in with a civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself 
on him.1 5
Within the economy of this discourse, both diff e rence and similarity are read in terms of
an already presupposed generalised notion. The ‘black’ person is like the ‘white’ person inso-
far as they are seen to conform to certain normative ideals and diff e rent insofar as they 
do not.
Difference and similarity
In the observations of early ‘explorers’ the diff e rences between European traveller and the
Indigenous peoples of Australia were typically re p resented in physical and bodily term s ,
or rather they took physical attributes to indicate broad social and cultural characteristics.
In this way, skin pigmentation, physique, manner and clothing were taken to measure their
distance from their ‘civilised’ and ‘modern’ visitors. In 1699, William Dampier put consid-
erable emphasis on two adjectives in his descriptions of ‘the Australian Aborigines’ he encoun-
t e red: ‘black’ and ‘naked’.1 6 In the later writings of Joseph Banks (1796), James Cook (1784)
and Charles Sturt (1833), these two points of re f e rence were expanded into a network of
attributes and characteristics that centred on ‘primitive-ness’ and an apparent absence of
‘civilised’ technologies.1 7 Aboriginal Australians became one of the most studied peoples
in the world, their value as objects and subjects of inquiry tied to their perceived temporal
location in the development of human society, civilisation, spirituality and biology.
Thus, descriptions of Aboriginal persons described not only Aboriginal culture, society,
a n a t o m y, physiology or biology, but also, by extension, their relation to the non-Indigenous
subject, read against the backdrop of a notion of humanity in general. Each point of re f e re n c e
—the shape of the skull, skin pigmentation, implements and technology, forms of subsistence,
religious systems and beliefs—more or less marked out the presumed place of Aborigines
and Aboriginal society in relation to some postulated system, historical model or form .
But, of course, as Michel Foucault has observed in his account of the emergence of the
human sciences, these various discourses that located, categorised and described the charac-
teristics of various ‘human types’ did not simply re p resent what was encountered, ‘discovere d ’
or observed. The idea of humanity is inseparably tied to a set of interests and concerns; it
both produces a certain way of conceiving and understanding the world and is produced by
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a particular and historically specific cultural, political and philosophical configuration. As
Foucault notes:
T h e re can be no doubt, cert a i n l y, that the historical emergence of each one of the human
sciences was occasioned by a problem, a re q u i rement, an obstacle or practical order [with-
in a particular social, cultural and political context.]1 8
In other words, the truth of the human is not taken to be tied to any particular empirical
subject or historical or cultural event or context; its generalisation beyond such contexts
or instantiations depends upon this. However, the idea itself is inseparably marked by its
historical genesis. Indeed, as critical philosophy has long been aware, the study of human-
ity often fails to consider its own conditions of possibility.
We imagine that we can properly delineate between what is cultural and what is biologi-
cal, genetic or physiological, as distinct and diff e rent ways of describing or understanding
h u m a n i t y. Nevertheless, in a sense, such postulation itself belongs to and emerges from cul-
t u re in the broad sense. Similarly, it is possible to conceive of a basis of Indigenous identi-
fication that is more substantial than what we understand to belong to ‘the cultural’ or ‘the
social’. To reiterate, my point here is not to deny the usefulness and importance of the notion
of ‘human’, but rather to highlight the dangers implicit in the conflation of identity with
genetic or biological re p resentations of human beings.
In some ways, the problem is more to do with the assumption that, since genetics and
biology do not support or justify a robust physiological basis for diff e rentiation along ethnic
or cultural lines, cultural diff e rence and identity are more to do with experiences, knowl-
edges and systems of beliefs. Of course, this not only overlooks the way this assumption
places itself outside of ‘the cultural’, but also fails to consider alternative ways of diff e re n t i a t-
ing that do not hinge upon the presuppositions of racial biology.
H e re, as Gayatri Spivak has observed, it is useful to consider the way in which ‘re p-
resentation’ is best understood as having two interrelated senses: ‘as “speaking for”, as in
politics, and … as “re - p resentation”, as in art and p h i l o s o p h y ’ .1 9 Keen to reveal the politics
of the conditions under which re p resentation becomes possible, she insists that we not con-
flate the two senses but rather consider how ‘re - p resentation’, in the sense of depiction, defi-
nition or characterisation, can fix or delimit what counts as ‘re p resentative’, as well as the
way re - p resentation always already implies and posits a re p resentor or a ‘speaking on behalf
o f’. At the very least, this prompts us to consider what and who is framing the non-We s t e rn
as ‘authentic’, ‘autonomous’ or ‘re p resentative’ and so alerts us to the fact that, as Jacques
D e rrida has observed, ‘the very project of attempting to fix the context of utterances, [mean-
ings or identities] … cannot be apolitical or politically neutral … and [is] never a pure l y
t h e o retical gesture ’ .2 0
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While the suggestion that identities are articulated relationally can be accepted as a uni-
versal proposition, criticism of the allegedly essentialist tendencies of re p resentations of
Indigenous cultures and cultural identities has led Andrew Lattas to argue that the critique
of essentialism ‘has come to operate recently as a “truth effect” in Aboriginal Studies; it has
become a common way by which white intellectuals can morally authorise themselves despite
coming from varied political positions’.2 1
What is often overlooked by such critiques, as Lattas suggests, is the way in which they
assume a generalisable notion of culture or identity: identity-in-general as constructed and
as defined re l a t i o n a l l y. While an essentialist notion of identity may be politically dangero u s ,
and may uncritically objectify and naturalise a specific notion of identity, a shift that objec-
tifies and naturalises ‘culture’ as the condition of identification may be equally dangero u s .
As Lynette Russell has observed, there is an intimate relationship between the ‘paradigm of
Aboriginality as descent, dependent as it is on mathematically demonstrable genetic links’
and the ‘discourse of Aboriginality as culture - t r a d i t i o n ’ .2 2
S i m i l a r l y, while cultural theory ’s problematisation of the objectivity of cultural categories
may be theoretically correct, insofar as it brings into question the manner in which objec-
tivity is constructed, this can also undermine the basis for the definition and protection of
rights and cultural pro p e rt y. Culture, while including a ‘world of “real” tangible objects and
things’, is taken to be principally a discursive complex or system not able to be thought of
as ‘real’ or ‘objective’ independently of those to whom ‘culture’ belongs.
A subject’s status as a member of a culture, like any relation of belonging, already pre-
supposes a position from which they are recognised as such. Thus, from one perspective, cul-
t u re is taken to constitute and orient subjects to ‘a world’ of things, actions, relations and
meanings. While from another perspective, cultures can be appraised for their veracity or
c o h e rence. The problem, of course, is that the position from which cultures tend to be ‘objec-
tively’ judged, verified and defined is typically derived from an assumedly ‘neutral’, but
ultimately Eurocentric, perspective.
T h e re are obvious contexts in which cultural diff e rentiation is re q u i red, such as when
t rying to establish who is entitled for certain rights, pro p e rties or entitlements. Historical
and social circumstances in Australia have created a situation in which clear and definitive
definitions can be enormously difficult. However, surely the most appropriate approach to
cultural definition is one that takes into consideration its link both to self-determ i n a t i o n ,
since members of a particular group should be the ones to determine how they define them-
selves, and, in an obviously related way, to how definitions themselves emerge from and
reflect cultural positions or perspectives.
Thus, while the notion of ‘race’ may be problematic, the shift into the vocabulary of
‘ethnicity’ or cultural identity may amount to an uncritical acceptance of an ethnocentric
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and universalist notion of identity and culture. Ethnicity may emphasise the contingent and
politically contested aspects of identity, but it both undermines the basis for a more sub-
stantial and ongoing claim and, in its crudest formulations, fails to critically consider the
relationship between the corporeal specificity of cultural bodies and epistemologies of iden-
tification and knowledge. Indeed, it is not as if the vocabulary of ‘race’ is simply mobilised
against Indigenous persons by non-Indigenous persons. As Russell notes, ‘ironically Abori-
ginal people themselves frequently imply a genetic basis for their identity’.2 3
It may just be the case that enabling Indigenous peoples to determine the meaning of ‘Indige-
nous or Aboriginal person’ results in something very much like a biological definition, b u t
if it did, it would do so because that was meaningful from that particular perspective. As M i c k
Dodson recommends, ‘If the element of descent is to remain in Australian law as a test of Abo-
r i g i n a l i t y, it should be interpreted in accordance with Indigenous cultural pro t o c o l s ’ .2 4
H o w, then, should we distinguish among the uses of terms that appear to imply a com-
mitment to a racial or biological notion of identity in Indigenous and non-Indigenous con-
texts? Of course, as I have suggested, the matter of who is defining who and its re l a t i o n s h i p
to issues of self-determination is highly relevant here. We might also allow for what Spivak
has called the ‘catachrestic’ use of names or terms to describe the way in which terms or
w o rds in colonial contexts are mobilised in a manner than resembles but differs from their
use in colonial discourse.2 5 As Spivak argues, the use of the terminology of colonial discourse
can be catachrestic in the sense:
that everyone knows that the so-called adequate narratives of the emergence of those things
w e re not written in the spaces that have decolonized themselves, but rather in the spaces
[and terminology] of the colonizers … There the question of essences becomes a question
of regulative political concepts.2 6
Hence, the terminology of race may resonant with epistemologies of descent and geneal-
ogy or with a corporeal or material foundation of identification without necessarily ascrib-
ing to a notion of race as biology as it has been articulated within scientific racist discourse.
E x p ressions are limited and restricted by the vocabularies and terminology available to them.
As Dodson has arg u e d :
The recent trend to charge self-re p resentations by Indigenous people with the politically
i n c o rrect crime of ‘essentialism’ is little more than a modern extension of the politics of con-
t rol over knowledge that has been going on since colonization … Cert a i n l y, the practice of
fixing us to our blood or our romanticised traditions has been a cornerstone of racist prac-
tices. But depriving us of our experiences with the past is another racist practice.2 7
— — — — — — — — — —
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